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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL.
VOLUME VII WINTER, 1953 NUMBER 1
JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES - A PROBLEM IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
"Nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel
per legem terrae."-Magna Carta.
Whitney R. Harris*
N the January, 1841, Term of the Supreme Court of the Re-
public of Texas the decision in Bailey v. Haddy was handed
down in an opinion by Judge Hutchinson.' The action was in tres-
pass for the burning of a dwelling. In refusing to reverse the
decision of the trial court based upon a jury verdict the court paid
this tribute to the jury system:
... The institution of jury trial has, perhaps, seldom or never been
fully appreciated. It has been often eulogized in sounding phrase, and
often decried and derided. An occasional corrupt, or biased, or silly
verdict is not enough for condemnation; and when it is said the insti-
tution interposes chances of justice and checks against venality and
oppression, the measure of just praise is not filled. Its immeasurable
benefits, like the perennial springs of the earth, flow from the fact that
considerable portions of the communities at stated periods are called
into the courts to sit as judges of contested facts, and under the min-
istry of the courts to apply the laws. There the constitution and prin-
ciples of the Civil Code are discussed, explained and enforced, and the
jurors return into the bosom of society instructed and enlightened,
and disseminate the knowledge acquired; and do we not perceive,
without further illustration, that to these nurseries of jurisprudence
and of the rights of man, more than to all other causes, the Anglo-
Saxon race has been pre-eminent for free institutions and all the polit-
ical, civil and social virtues that elevate mankind! Let us then preserve
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1 Dall. Dec. 35.
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and transmit this mode of trial not only inviolate, but if possible, puri-
fied and perfected.2
That this statement may have been the inspiration for the lan-
guage used in the Bill of Rights of the 1876 Constitution of Texas
is suggested by Article I, Section 15, which provides, in part, as
follows:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature
shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to
maintain its purity and efficiency.
This may be called the Bill of Rights section on the right of trial
by jury.'
The Judiciary Article of the Constitution contains in Article V,
Section 10, the further provision:
In the trial of all causes in the District Courts, the plaintiff or defend-
ant shall, upon application made in open court, have the right of trial
by jury. ..."
This may be called the Judiciary section on the right of trial
by jury.
The reconciliation of these constitutional provisions gives rise
to a problem of some difficulty and of considerable importance.
The language in the Bill of Rights section suggests that the right
of trial by jury, as it existed at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution in 1876, shall be preserved; it does not purport to
extend that right to cases in which parties were not entitled to
trial by jury at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, nor
to cases based upon rights established after that date. The lan-
21d. at 40, 41. This praise of the jury system in civil cases was restated in the fol.
lowing words by Judge Ridgell of the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals in Northcutt
v. Northcutt, 287 S. W. 515, 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926): "This valuable right of trial
by jury is one of the greatest and most blessed securities afforded to free men. It is
a landmark in our constitutional guaranties, and the abridgement of same would
bring dire results to our form of government. To have the property right and the lib-
erty passed upon by a jury of one's peers is a privilege born in necessity and nurtured
in justice."
8 In 1935 this section was amended to enable the Legislature to provide for the
temporary commitment, for observation and treatment, of mentally ill persons not
charged with a criminal offense, for a period of time not to exceed ninety days by
order of the county court without trial by jury.
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guage in the Judiciary section, on the other hand, purports to
accord the right of trial by jury in the trial of every cause in the
district courts, without regard to whether the right existed at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution or came into the law after
the adoption of the Constitution.4 That this analysis, based upon
the literal language of these constitutional provisions, has not been
accepted by the courts in all respects is apparent from the decisions
hereinafter discussed. In spite of long judicial experiences in
applying these sections to cases in which the right to trial by jury
has been contested, a formula of interpretation which gives full
effect to the terminology and purposes of each section has yet
to appear in the decisions. The objective of this inquiry is to
examine the theories of construction which have been applied
heretofore and to suggest principles of interpretation which may
be useful in determining rights of such significance to personal
liberty and to judicial integrity.'
It is clearly established in Texas that the Legislature may not
deprive parties of any right to jury trial in civil cases which
4 As to trials in the county courts the Judiciary Article does no more than recognize
the right to trial by jury as otherwise guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. Article V,
Section 17, provides in part as follows: "A jury in the County Court shall consist of
six men; but no jury shall be empaneled to try a civil case unless demanded by one
of the parties. ... "
5 The Constitution of the State of Texas of 1845 provided for trial by jury in all
criminal prosecutions. Art. I, § 8. This provision has been carried forward through all
subsequent Constitutions to the present Constitution, where it appears as Article I,
Section 10. CONST. 1861, Art. I, § 8; CONST. 1866, Art. I, § 8; CONST. 1869, Art. I,
§ 8. See SAYLES, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS (3d ed. 1888).
The 1845 Constitution contained a general provision that the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate. Art. I, § 12. In its original setting, this right seemed likewise
to relate to criminal prosecutions: "No person, for the same offense, shall be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall a person be again put upon trial for the same
offense after a verdict of not guilty; and the right of trial by jury shall remain invio-
late." It was continued in that context in the Constitutions of 1861, 1866, and 1869. In
the present Constitution it is retained, but without any context showing limitation to
criminal prosecutions.
The Constitution of 1845 contained a provision that in the trial of all causes in
equity in the district courts the parties shall have the right of trial by jury, to be gov-
erned by the rules and regulations prescribed in trials at law. Art. IV, § 16. This pro-
vision was carried over into the 1861 Constitution and to the 1866 Constitution, in
which, however, the Judiciary Article was revised somewhat to provide that in all
cases of law or equity, where the matter in controversy shall be valued at, or exceed,
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury should be preserved. CONST. 1861, Art. IV, §
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existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. In White
v. White' the supreme court held unconstitutional the 1913 lunacy
statute7 which permitted judgment of lunacy to be entered upon
the unanimous report of six physician-commissioners without trial
by jury. The court, speaking through Judge Hawkins, noted that
the provision that "the right of trial by jury shall remain invio-
late," had formed a part of every Constitution of the State and
even of the Republic of Texas, as well as of the constitutions of
many other states, with a well-established import and meaning
that a party to a civil proceeding is "entitled to a trial by jury,
in the full constitutional sense, if that practice prevailed in this
State, according to then existing laws, at the time of the adoption
of said provisions as portions, of our present State Constitution
of 1876."' The court observed that at common law the trial of
a charge of insanity was before a jury, and that under the law
of the State of Texas and the practice existing when the jury
provision was adopted as a part of the present Constitution, "one
charged with insanity was, it seems certain, entitled to and was
given, a trial by jury."9 The privilege existing in other states
under which the legislature may dispense with a jury in certain
cases was declared inapplicable to our judicial system and laws
and "obnoxious to our Constitution when it is read in the light
of preexisting Texas laws relating to jury trials in lunacy cases.""
The court held that "[t]he asserted right having existed at com-
16; CONST. 1866, Art. IV, § 20. In the 1869 Constitution the Judiciary Article was
revised to provide that in all cases of law or equity, when the matter in controversy
shall be valued at, or exceed, ten dollars, the right of trial by jury should be preserved,
unless waived by the parties or their attorneys, except in defaults where the cause of
action is liquidated and proved by an instrument in writing; and it was further pro-
vided that in the trial of all causes in the district court the parties should have the
right of trial by jury. Art. V, §§ 16, 26. The present Constitution does not provide
expressly for a right of jury trial in equity cases.
6 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W. 508 (1917).
7 Acts 1913, c. 163, pp. 341-347.
8 108 Tex. at 581, 196 S. W. at 512.
I Id. at 582, 196 S. W. at 512. The court noted that jury trial in lunacy cases was
provided by the Act of February 5, 1858, and that the provision stood as law when the-
present Constitution was ratified.
SMId. at 587, 196 S. W. at 515.
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mon law and in various American States and especially in Texas
prior and down to the adoption of our present Constitution," so
much of the act as provided for a hearing before a commission,
"in lieu of the time-honored trial by jury" was invalid."
It is equally well-established that the Bill of Rights section does
not confer a right to trial by jury in a proceeding in which that
right was not accorded at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. In Cockrill v. Cox, 2 decided by the supreme court in 1886,
the court, speaking through Justice Robertson, observed that a
provision preserving the right of trial by jury, expressed in sub-
stantially the same language as the Bill of Rights section, "is to
be found in all the state constitutions, and it has been uniformly
construed to perpetuate the right in the cases in which it exists,
under the laws in force and practice prevailing at the date of the
adoption of the particular constitution."' 3 Under the system of
probate practice existing at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution of 1876 a jury trial was not accorded in the county court,
and the court saw "no constitutional objection to the refusal of
a jury in the contest in the county court."' 4
Texas is exceptional in allowing, as of constitutional right, trial
by jury in equitable actions. 5 In Ex parte Allison, 6 which in-
volved the validity of an act of the Legislature authorizing the
11 Ibid.
12 65 Tex. 669.
13 Id. at 674.
14 Id. at 673. In this same case, however, the court noted that at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution the uniform practice was to accord the right of trial by
jury in will contests tried in the district courts. And it concluded that, under the Bill
of Rights and Judiciary sections of the Constitution the parties were entitled, as a
matter of constitutional right, to trial by jury of contested fact issues in will contests
in the district court.
15 Right to trial by jury usually is not accorded in equity actions. See 50 C. J. S.,
Juries, § 23, p. 737. And this is true even where law and equity have been merged into
a single form of action. Hasty v. Pierpont, 146 Kan. 517, 72 P. 2d 69 (1937). In such
cases right to jury trial will depend upon whether the action is equitable in nature.
Bettencourt v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 216 Cal. 174, 13 P. 2d 659
(1932).
1899 Tex. 455, 462, 90 S. W. 870, 871, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1111 (1906).
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State or any citizen thereof to bring suit to enjoin the use of a build-
ing for gambling, Chief Justice Gaines observed that in those
jurisdictions in which legal and equitable remedies are separately
administered, parties are generally entitled to have fact issues
determined by a jury in courts of law, but not in courts of equity.
"But," he said, "under our system in which law and equity are
blended and the right of trial by jury exists, whether the remedy
be legal or equitable, the difficulty vanishes. Before the injunc-
tion could be made perpetual under the statute in question it is
the right of the defendant to have the jury pass upon the facts.' 17
Of course, suits for injunctions were well known at the time of.
the adoption of the Constitution. Furthermore, previous Constitu-
tions had provided expressly for right to jury trial in equity
actions in the district courts.'8 But the type of equitable proceed-
ing involved in Dallas Joint Stock and Bank of Dallas v. State 9
had not been recognized at the time of the adoption of the Consti-
tution. The action was an independent suit in the nature of a bill
of discovery. As the court said, "a bill of discovery as an inde-
pendent action, was unknown to our jurisprudence until authorized
by the Legislature in 1923. "20 Yet, without distinguishing the Bill
of Rights and Judiciary sections, the court held, on the basis of
the reasoning of Chief Justice Gaines in the Allison case, that
the parties were entitled to have controverted issues of fact that
tended to establish or defeat the right to a discovery determined
by jury.
The plain language of the Judiciary section conferring the right
of trial by jury in all causes in the district courts would seem to
17 "The distinctions between law and equity have never obtained in Texas. They
were not recognized in the earliest times when the civil law of Mexico was admin-
istered. They were unknown to the Constitution of Coahuila in Texas. After independ-
ence the Constitution of the Republic ignored' them. Each succeeding Constitution of
the state has expressly denied their existence. At most, the distinction in this state
is a very narrow one. In some spects it may be said to be more one of form than of
substance." City of Dallas v. McElroy, 254 S. W. 599, 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
18 See note 5 supra.
1' 133 S. W. 2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
20 Id. at 829.
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entitle parties to jury trials irrespective of whether that right
existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. This con-
struction was placed upon that section by the supreme court,
speaking through Chief Justice Gaines, in the 1907 decision of
Tolle v. Tolle,2 where it was held that an applicant for letters of
administration upon the estate of a deceased person was entitled
to a trial by jury in the district court. The court noted that the
Judiciary section provides for trial by jury of all "causes" in the
district courts. "Language cannot be more comprehensive than
this. Hence, if a probate proceeding is properly styled a 'cause,'
this section undoubtedly gives a right of trial by jury. Bouvier
defines a 'cause' as: 'a suit or action. Any question civil or crimi-
nal contested before a court of justice.' The questions in this case
are certainly questions contested before a court."2 The court did
not refer to any right of jury trial in contests over letters of ad-
ministration in the district courts at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, although an analogy was drawn to will contests
as to which the right to jury trial in the district courts had been
recognized in Cockrill v. Cox. The case might have been sustained
under the Bill of Rights section of the Constitution; but the court
placed it expressly within the "comprehensive language" of the
Judiciary section.
Notwithstanding the decision of the supreme court in the Tolle
case, exceptions to trial by jury in the district courts have been
recognized and approved. In most cases consideration has not
been given to the different scope and effect of these sections, which
their terminology seems to require. Sometimes an exception has
been justified on the ground that one section does not apply,
without regard to possible right of jury trial under the other
section; sometimes both sections have been construed as one.
Illustrative of the categories of actions in which jury trial has
been refused in the district courts on such grounds are the fol-
lowing: (1) election contests; (2) contempt proceedings; (3)
21 101 Tex. 33, 104 S. W. 1049.
22 Id. at 33, 34, 104 S. W. at 1050.
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proceedings for child custody; (4) adoption proceedings; (5)
review of administrative decisions.
1. Election contests. The supreme court has held that trial by
jury is not guaranteed under the Judiciary section in election con-
test cases because such contests are not "causes" within the mean-
ing of Article V, Section 10. Hammond v. Ashe2" involved the
trial in the district court of the contest of a primary election for
sheriff. The court, speaking through Justice Williams, said: "In
this case we think it clear that the right of trial by jury does not
exist. The statute does not allow it, and the provision of the Con-
stitution (art. V, sec. 10) has no application. The language of
the latter does not embrace contested elections as 'causes' in
which the right of trial by jury is secured."'" The decision of the
court constitutes a reasonable construction of the word "cause."
The proceeding is statutory, and the issue is essentially political.
It is sound to assume that civil proceedings of this kind were not
contemplated as "causes" within the meaning of Article V, Sec-
tion 10, when adopted. But nothing was said in the opinion as to
the possibility of a right to jury trial under Article I, Section 15.
2. Contempt proceedings. It is interesting to note that the
denial of trial by jury in civil contempt proceedings in the district
courts was supported by Chief Justice Gaines in spite of his opin-
ion in the Tolle case. Ex parte Allison25 involved the constitution-
ality of an act of the Legislature authorizing the State or any
citizen thereof to enjoin the habitual, actual, contemplated, or
threatened use of any premises for the purpose of gaming. Chief
Justice Gaines held that whereas a party would be entitled to
trial by jury on the issuance of the injunction, he would not be
entitled to jury trial in contempt proceedings thereafter invoked
against him. Chief Justice Gaines did not contend that the pro-
23 103 Tex. 503, 131 S. W. 539 (1910).
24 Id. at 504, 131 S. W. at 539. To the same effect, see McCormick v. Jester, 115
S. W. 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
25 99 Tex. 455, 90 S. W. 870 (1906).
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ceedings on contempt in the district, court would not constitute the
trial of a cause within the meaning of the Judiciary section. He
did not discuss that section at all. Instead he concluded that there
was no constitutional right to trial by jury because the Bill of
Rights section only protects such rights as they "existed at the
time the constitution went into effect."26 Of course, he correctly
observed that "no such right exists at common law in proceedings
for contempt."27 The rule of the Allison case has been uniformly
followed, even where violation of the contempt order may con-
stitute a criminal act.2"
3. Proceedings for child custody. That the Judiciary section
does not guarantee right of jury trial in habeas corpus cases for
custody of minor children was first declared in Pittman v. Byars,
decided in 1908.29 In the court's words, "on the 19th of June said
cause came on for trial, whereupon defendants presented excep-
tions and demurrers to plaintiffs' petition, which were sustained
by the court and the suit was dismissed.""0 By their first assign-
ment of error appellants urged that the district court erred in
refusing to grant them a trial by jury, as they had requested. The
court observed that the language of the Constitution granting the
right of trial by jury to every party in all cases in the district
court "is sufficiently broad and expansive to grant the right here
contended for, unless it be held that prior to and at the time of
the adoption of our Constitution this character of action was not
such a one as entitled the parties thereto to the right of trial by
jury."'" It noted that in other jurisdictions jury trials were gen-
26 Id. at 462, 90 S. W. at 870, 871.
27 Ibid.
28 Ex parte Houston, 87 Tex. Grim. Rep. 8, 219 S. W. 926 (1920). Better reasoning
for the rule was stated by the court of criminal appeals, through Judge Ramsey, in
Ex parte Roper: "Nor can it be maintained that the Act in question is invalid because
it denies the right of trial by jury. The right of trial by jury in respect to the offense
against the law is not controverted by this Act. The matter inquired into by the court
in this proceeding relates strictly to the matter of contempt, and to the violation of the
court's order." 61 Tex. Grim. Rep. 68, 78, 134 S. W. 334, 339 (1910).
,29 112 S. W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App.).
30 ld. at 103.
21 Id. at 105.
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erally refused in habeas corpus cases, and that this practice had
prevailed in Texas under earlier Constitutions. "Therefore," the
court concluded, "we are inclined to follow the beaten path of
the common law as well as the uniform practice by our own courts,
and hold that the court below did not err in refusing to grant
appellants a trial by jury."82 The court thus construed the Judi-
ciary section as having precisely the same scope as the Bill of
Rights section. It was recognized however, that "the court or judge
sitting on the return to a writ of habeas corpus may in its discre-
tion order any controverted fact in the matter to be tried by a
jury.98
The rule of Pittman v. Byars was followed by the commission
of appeals in Burckhalter v. Conyer43 and Duckworth v. Thomp-
son,8" both of which were habeas corpus proceedings for custody
of minor children. But in the Burckhalter case, while approving
Pittman v. Byars, the court based its decision upon the unique fea-
tures of the habeas corpus proceeding itself. "The writ of habeas
corpus is a writ of right, designed to protect the individual against
any character of illegal restraint. The efficacy of this writ lies in
the prompt and speedy hearing given an applicant seeking the
protection of its beneficent provisions. If the hearing under such
writ can be delayed by the demand for a jury, its effectiveness
would be largely impaired." In effect, the court held that the
proceeding of habeas corpus is not a "cause" within the meaning
of the Judiciary section, and. it concluded: "We therefore hold
that where the custody and possession of a child is not sought
merely through an ordinary suit, but by invoking the writ of
habeas corpus, neither party thereto is entitled to a jury trial as a
matter of right.""6
32 d. at 106.
33 Id. at 105. And see Joseph v. Puryear, 273 S. W. 974 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
349 S. W. 2d 1029 (1928).
35 37 S. W. 2d 731 (1931).
369 S. W. 2d at 1029. See also Strode v. Silverman, 217 S. W. 2d 454 (Tex. CiY.
App. 1949).
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Unfortunately, the matter cannot be left there because problems
of custody of children may arise in ordinary suits, as well as in
habeas corpus proceedings. In Northcutt v. Northcutte7 a jury was
impaneled in a divorce action in which both parties sought custody
of a minor child. After evidence had been offered, the court
stated that it was of the opinion that the parties were each entitled
to a divorce, and by agreement that issue was withdrawn from
the jury."8 Appellant insisted that the issue of custody of the
minor child should then be submitted to the jury. The court
denied the request and rendered judgment granting the divorce
and determining custody of the child. The court of civil appeals
held that the trial court properly removed the custody issue from
the jury on the theory that the Legislature had authority under
Article V, Section 8, of the Constitution (which gives to the dis-
trict courts original jurisdiction over minors "under such regula-
tions as may be prescribed by law") to empower the court, in all
divorce suits, to give the custody of children to the father or
mother as the court shall deem right and proper.89 The difficulty
with this reasoning is that it would subject to legislative determi-
nation the right to trial by jury in many other instances in which
Article V, Section 8, confers similar jurisdiction upon the district
courts.4 Denial of jury trial in this case might have been based
upon the responsibility which the State has for the well-being of
87 287 S. W. 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
38 Parties to a contested divorce action are entitled to trial by jury. TFx. Rav. Civ.
STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4632. And it is proper to submit to the jury a single issue
as to whether the acts and conduct of one spouse toward the other constituted such
excess, cruel treatment or outrage, if any, of such a nature as to render their further
living together as husband and wife insupportable. Howell v. Howell, 147 Tex. 14,
210 S. W. 2d 978 (1948). Notwithstanding.a jury verdict finding grounds for divorce,
both trial and appellate courts may independently determine whether the evidence is
full and satisfactory to support a decree for divorce. Train v. Train, 209 S. W. 2d 212
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
39 TEx. REv. CiM. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4639.
40 The district courts have original jurisdiction and general control over executors,
administrators, guardians and minors, and appellate jurisdiction over the county com-
missioners court, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. TEx. CONST.
Art. V, § 8. It is difficult to believe that the provision "under such regulations as may
be prescribed by law" was intended to affect in any way the right to trial by jury guar-
anteed under other provisions of the Constitution.
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minor children- the courts, rather than juries, performing the
function historically assumed by the chancellor in the protection
of minor children. It is everywhere accepted that "the interest and
future of the child is paramount to all other considerations."41 It
could be said that this interest lies exclusively within the courts
to protect and that, in this sense, a child custody case is not a
"cause" within the meaning of the Judiciary section.
4. Adoption proceedings. The theory by which the courts may
determine custody of children without trial by jury applies with
particular force to adoption proceedings. In such cases the parents
have, in effect, relinquished their claim in the child to the State
and to the adopting parents, and the courts, representing the State,
and charged with the protection of the welfare of the child, may
determine fitness to adopt without reference to a jury. It may be
contended, as in the custody cases, that such a proceeding is not
a "cause" within the meaning of Article V, Section 10. In the
1951 decision of the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Hickman
v. Smith,42 however, the court failed to distinguish between the
Bill of Rights section and the Judiciary section in approving the
action of the trial court in denying a jury in an adoption pro-
ceeding. The court said: "The right to trial by jury as guaranteed
by Art. 1, Sec. 15, of the Bill of Rights to the Texas Constitu-
tion, and Art. 5, Section 10, of such Constitution, Vernon's Ann.
St., is limited to the right of trial by jury as it existed at common
law or as provided by statutes in effect at the time of the adoption
of our Constitution in 1876."'4a
5. Review of Administrative Decisions. The right of jury trial
on review of administrative orders of the Liquor Control Board
came under consideration recently in Texas Liquor Control Board
v. Jones," where, on appeal from an order of the Texas Liquor
41 Northcutt v. Northcutt, 287 S. W. 515, 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
42 238 S. W. 2d 838.
43 Id. at 839.
44 112 S. W. 2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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Control Board cancelling the license of appellee, the granting of
a jury trial by the trial court was held to be error in view of the
statute which provides expressly that upon trial of the cause in
the district court "neither party shall be entitled to a jury. ' ' 4" The
court declared: "It is definitely settled in Texas that the right of
trial by jury as provided in the foregoing provisions [Article I,
Section 15, and Article V, Section 10] means the right of trial by
jury as it existed at common law or by statutory provisions at the
time of the adoption of our Constitution in 1876.... From an
examination of the statutes, we find that a proceeding such as an
appeal from the action of an administrative body either granting
or revoking a license to sell intoxicating liquor was unknown to
the law of Texas at the time of the adoption of our present Con-
stitution, and hence we had no statutes at that time which pro-
vided for a jury trial in a proceeding of this nature."46 This treat-
ment of both sections as one cannot be justified upon their express
language. But the court did observe and hold that "the cancella-
tion of a permit to sell liquor under the Liquor Control Act and
the principle of law governing such matters is not a civil suit or
cause of action.
47
The right to jury trial in Texas on judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions is complicated by the wide use of the substantial
evidence rule. Under this rule decisions of administrative
agencies will be sustained if reasonably supported by substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole. 9 Whether an order
of an administrative agency is reasonably supported by substan-
45 TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) art. 666-14.
46 112 S. W. 2d at 229.
47 Ibid. Cf. State v. De Silva, 105 Tex. 95, 145 S. W. 330 (1912).
48 The scope of the rule and exceptions thereto appear in Harris, The Administra-
tive Law of Texas, 29 Tex. L. Rev. 213, 227 (1950). In recent state legislation further
exceptions have been enacted: Texas Real Estate Commission, TEx. RaV. CIv. STAT.
(Vernon, 1950 Supp.) art. 6573a, § 15; Railroad Commission, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT.
(Vernon, 1950 Supp.) art. 6053; County Herbicide Inspectors, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
(Vernon, 1952 Supp.) art. 135b-3, § 25.
49 Larson, The Substantial Evidence Rule: Texas Version, 5 Southw. L. J. 152 (1951).
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tial evidence is said to be a question of law."0 The strong oppo-
sition of Chief Justice Alexander to the substantial evidence rule
in the Trapp case was based in part on his contention that under
this rule parties would be deprived of their right to trial of the
issues before a jury,5 since the constitutional guarantee of jury
trial relates solely to fact issues' 2 and not to questions of law.5"
Where the substantial evidence rule is not applied by the
courts on review of administrative decisions, the right to jury
trial should depend upon whether the right is conferred, or denied,
by the Legislature. Some statutes provide expressly for trial by
jury on judicial review of administrative decisions"54 The only
statute expressly denying trial by jury is the one governing ap-
peals from decisions of the Texas Liquor Control Board.55 Most
statutes are silent as to the right of parties to have fact issues
determined by a jury on appeal from administrative decisions.
Nevertheless, juries have been impaneled under such statutes,56
even in the most complicated rate cases where the value of jury
trial is at least open to serious question."
50 Hawkins v. Texas Co., 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. 2d 338 (1948) ; Thomas v. Stano-
lind Oil & Gas Co., 145 Tex. 270, 198 S. W. 2d 420 (1946).
51 Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 352, 198 S. W. 2d 424, 442 (1946).
52 Thorne v. Moore, 101 Tex. 205, 210, 105 S. W. 985, 987 (1907): "The right of
trial by jury exists only with respect to disputed issues of fact."
53 Ward v. State ex rel. Carman, 200 Okla. 51, 196 P. 2d 856, 4 A. L. R. 2d 436 (1947).
54 E.g., Texas State Board of Dental Examiners, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon,
1952 Supp.) art. 4549; Texas Real Estate Commission, TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon,
1950 Supp.) art. 6573, § 15.
55 The legislative proscription against trial by jury on review of decisions of the
Liquor Control Board may be of little legal significance in view of the application of
the substantial evidence rule to judicial review of orders refusing, cancelling or
suspending liquor permits, notwithstanding the statutory requirement of trial de novo
"under the same rules as ordinary suits," Tax. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 666-14
and 667-6. Ramos v. Austin, 220 S. W. 2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Louder v. Texas
Liquor Control Board, 214 S. W. 2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.; State v.
Peeler, 200 S. W. 2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Texas Liquor Control Board v. Floyd,
117 S. W. 2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ; Texas Liquor Control Board v. Jones, 112
S. W. 2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 108 S. W.
2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Contra, Texas Liquor Control Board v. Saiz, 220 S. W.
2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
56 United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U. S. 123, 141 (1937).
57 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. State, 255 S. W. 390 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
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In United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas"8 an appeal was
taken from a rate order of the Railroad Commission to the dis-
trict court under a statute which was silent as to the right of jury
trial.59 In the district court trial was to a jury on the general ques-
tion of whether the rate fixed by the Commission was unreason-
able and unjust as to the public utility. It does not appear that
any objection was raised to the trial by jury at that time. The
verdict was that the rate was not unreasonable, and the judgment
of the trial court based thereon was affirmed in the court of civil
appeals. The Supreme Court of the United States granted cer-
tiorari, however, and in that Court the contention was advanced
that the granting of trial by jury on judicial review of the order
of the Railroad Commission was contrary to procedural due
process. In holding to the contrary, the Supreme Court stated:
"The state is entitled to determine the procedure of its courts, so
long as it provides the requisite due process. And on that question
we have never held that it is beyond the power of the state to
provide for the trial by a jury of questions of fact because they
are complicated." ' No consideration was given by the court of
civil appeals or by the Supreme Court of the United States to the
fact that trial by jury was not, in this case, called for by statute.
Nor can it be determined whether the trial court, in impaneling
the jury, did so in the belief that either party was entitled to jury
trial as a matter of constitutional right. Proceedings for judicial
review of administrative decisions were not known to the law at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution; nor are they prop-
erly to be regarded as "causes" within the meaning of the Judi-
ciary section. While the courts may impanel juries to assist them
in arriving at fact findings in these, as in other cases, the right to
jury trial on review of administrative decisions is not prescribed
by the Constitution but is to be found, if at all, in the applicable
statutes.
Ss 89 S. W. 2d 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
59 TEm. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6059.
60303 U. S. 123, 140 (1937).
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Difficulty encountered by trial courts in deciding whether
parties are entitled as of constitutional right to trial by jury in
actions established since the adoption of the Constitution may
have been the result of inadequate analysis of the Bill of Rights
and the Judiciary sections, respectively. Such analysis should give
appropriate effect and weight to each section, separately consid-
ered. The following simple rules comprise a formula of interpre-
tation, within the wording of these vital provisions of the Consti-
tution, as related to the trial of civil actions in the district courts
which may be of assistance in determining the constitutional right
of jury trial in future cases.
1. There is a constitutional right of trial by jury in any action
or proceeding in which that right was accorded at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution.
2. There is a constitutional right of trial by jury in any ordi-
nary cause of action in the district courts whether or not such
right was accorded at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
3. There is no constitutional right of trial by jury in special
civil proceedings in the district courts, other than ordinary causes
of action, unless jury trial was accorded in any such proceedings
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
4. In the absence of any constitutional right of trial by jury
the Legislature may provide for jury trial in any action or pro-
ceeding, or the court at its discretion may seek the advisory opin-
ion of a jury.
Rule 1 follows directly from the Bill of Rights section which
declares that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
Clearly, under that section every person is entitled to jury trial in
all actions and proceedings in which that right was accorded at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution. The right cannot be
impaired by any act of the Legislature.6'
61 White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W. 508 (1917).
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Rule 2 follows directly from the Judiciary section, which de-
clares that parties shall be entitled to a jury in the trial of every
cause in the district courts. In the Tolle case Chief Justice Gaines
quoted one of the definitions given by Bouvier of the word
"cause." That definition was the broad usage under which "cause"
is considered as equivalent to "action" or "suit" or "any ques-
tion.., contested before a court of justice." But Bouvier also
treats "cause" as meaning, in some usages, the "cause of action"
which arises upon the breach of a duty or the violation of a right
recognized in the law.62 "Cause" could not have been intended by
the framers of the Constitution to be equivalent to every "suit"
or "action," for even at the time the Constitution was adopted,
there were some cases in which trial by jury was not accorded
in the district courts.68 Therefore, it must have been intended to
refer to the ordinary "causes of action."
Rule 3 is based upon the construction of the word "cause," as
used in the Judiciary section, to mean ordinary "causes of ac-
tion." This usage permits the differentiation therefrom of other
"civil proceedings." Such a distinction has long been recognized
in the legal theory which has developed about the right to trial
by jury. 4 The Judiciary section should not be construed as em-
bracing special civil proceedings.6 5 Constitutional right to trial by
jury in any such proceedings must be found under the Bill of
Rights section, as having been accorded by the courts at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution.
62 1 BoUvIER'S L. DICT. (3d rev. 1914) 436.
63 B. B. Brazos and Colorado R. R. Co. v. Ferris, 26 Tex. 588 (1863), condemnation
proceedings; Pelham v. The State, 30 Tex. 422 (1867), proceeding to determine validity
of land patents.
64 See 50 C. J. S., Juries, § 50, p. 761, et seq.; 35 C. J., Juries, § 62, p. 178, et seq.
05 CoRPUs JURIS SECUNDUM lists the following civil proceedings in which trial by
jury generally is not accorded: mandamus, habeas corpus, enforcement of health reg-
ulations, administration of estates of decedents, probate and contest of wills, guard-
ianship, insolvency, proceedings for assessments for public improvements, condemna-
tion proceedings, proceedings against public officers, enforcement of bonds and recog-
nizances, revocation or cancellation of licenses and permits, disbarment and other pro-
ceedings against attorneys, seizures, penalties, forfeitures, and miscellaneous other
proceedings. 50 C. J. S., Juries, p. 762 et seq.
1953]
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Rule 4 is adequately supported by judicial precedent. Trial by
jury is not a requisite of due process of law;66 nor is it a privilege
or immunity which states are forbidden to abridge.67 In Janes v.
Reynolds' Adm'rs68 Chief Justice Hemphill declared that a trial
according to the "law of the land" had never been interpreted "to
enjoin in all cases a trial by jury as a requisite indispensable to
the validity of a judgment."69 He noted numerous instances of
trials without jury, including the rendition of judgment by de-
fault, or on confession of the party, or on demurrer, or in cases of
contempt, and he observed that "under the common law of Eng-
land, all causes in the courts of equity and admiralty, in courts
military and ecclesiastical, are determined without the interven-
tion of a jury."7 The extent to which trial by jury will be allowed
as of right in various actions may be, and frequently is, provided
by statute.7
The formula of interpretation based upon these four rules may
be applied to actions or proceedings established by law since the
adoption of the Constitution. Under these rules the two most
recent cases, Hickman v. Smith7 and Texas Liquor Control Board
v. Jones,7 seem to have been correctly decided. Neither an
adoption proceeding nor the review of orders of the Liquor Con-
trol Board constitutes an ordinary cause of action; and in neither
was trial by jury accorded at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution. It is doubtful whether Dallas Joint Stock and Bank of
Dallas v. State7 would be decided in the same way under this
formula. The independent suit for discovery is not an ordinary
cause of action, and it was unknown at the time of the adoption
06 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 (1917).
67 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900).
682 Tex. 250 (1847).
69 Id. at 252.
70 Ibid.
71 Meigs v. Theis, 102 Conn. 579, 129 Ad. 551 (1925).
72 238 S. W. 2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
73 112 S. W. 2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
74 133 S. W. 2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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of the Constitution. It seems, rather, to be a special proceeding,
equitable in nature, as to which no right of jury trial is guaranteed
under either the Bill of Rights or the Judiciary section of the
Constitution. On the other hand, Ex parte Allison,75 an ordinary
suit for injunction to restrain use of premises for gambling, would
seem to call for jury trial under both sections. The rules may be
applied to actions and proceedings hereafter created by the Legis-
lature. Under them full effect can be given to each section of the
Constitution relating to trial by jury in civil actions in the district
courts. At the same time, exceptions to trial by jury, long-recog-
nized in the law, can be adequately accommodated thereunder.
A learned King's Counsel once said: "The more I see of trial
by judge, the more highly I think of trial by jury.""6 Whether
facetious or not, the statement reflects the emotional attachment
which all of us who have been schooled in the common law feel
for the institution of the jury. There is, seemingly, security in the
sometimes-prejudiced, sometimes-confused, sometimes-inaccurate
verdicts of jurors. They have a way of reaching a just result, even
if they fail now and then to make a right decision. In a recent
debate in the House of Lords over the question of the abolition of
special juries in England, Lord Simon quoted from Sir Patrick
Hastings, one of England's most eminent barristers, the following:
"I am satisfied that in the end twelve ordinary English men and
women sitting together form the best tribunal that civilization
has yet devised, and any legislator who seeks to curtail the
activities of juries does a great disservice to the nation."77 Sir
Patrick probably spoke of criminal trials; yet one may doubt
whether he would have agreed with Holmes that trial judges may
decide fact issues in civil cases more competently than jurors. "A
judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a
75 99 Tex. 455, 90 S. W. 870 (1906).
76 The late Mr. B. R. Wise, quoted by P. A. Jacobs, Trial by Jury - Its Origin and
its Merits, 21 Aust. L. J. 462 (1948).
77 Hollander, A Change in the Old Order: England Streamlines Her Jury System,
36 A. B. A. J. 455, 456 (1950).
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fund of experience which enables him to represent the common
sense of the community in ordinary instances far better than an
average jury. He should be able to lead and to instruct them in
detail, even where he thinks it desirable, on the whole, to take their
opinions. Furthermore, the sphere in which he is able to rule
without taking their opinion at all should be continually
growing. '"
No issue has been drawn here as to the faults and merits of the
jury system in civil actions and proceedings. The jury is not
widely used outside of the United States and Canada. Even in
England its use in civil cases has been sharply limited by law. 9
But the jury system is a vital and established part of the adminis-
tration of civil justice in this country. And the province of the
jury, in fundamental law, ought, therefore, to be clearly defined.
The rules of construction proposed herein suggest a formula of
interpretation which may be helpful to that end in Texas.
78 HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 124.
79 In civil causes in England there is a right to a jury in the Queen's Bench Division
only if a charge of fraud is made against the party making application for a jury, or
if a claim in respect of libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduc-
tion, or breach of promise of marriage is in issue, unless the court or judge is of the
opinion that the trial requires a prolonged examination of documents or accounts or
any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury; in
all other cases it lies within the discretion of the court or judge to order trial with or
without jury. In the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division a jury may be obtained
in probate actions and matrimonial causes. 13 HALSPUJRY'S STAT. OF ENC. (2d ed. 1949)
387.
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